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How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA. By Richard Neely. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. xvii, 233. $15.
Although the debate over the proper role of courts and judges in
a constitutional democracy has raged for decades, no consensus has
yet emerged. Nor, if the recent literature is indicative, 1 have original
contributions been precluded by the sheer vastness of the existing
commentary. InHow Courts Govern America, Richard Neely, Chief
Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, draws on his
experience as legislator and judge2 and makes a contribution that is
original in several respects. After exposing the structural deficiencies
4. Lay readers will find Wishman's careful and simple description of criminal justice and
procedure to be a refreshing look at the court system.
1. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980);
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Chayes, The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
2. Neely views this work as a reflection of his own experiences as a legislator and appellate
judge. He dispenses with footnotes as "redundant" for the scholar. P. xiv. In the text itself, he
makes few references either to other theories or to analyses that support his argument.
Neely would have improved his somewhat wandering arguments ifhe had discussed these
other theories or analyses. At times the text degenerates into strings of anecdotes, with digressions on the Reagan economic plans, pp. 71-72, democracy in the third world, pp. 139-44, and
the importance of a liberal education, pp. 223-26.
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of the executive and legislative branches, he argues that politically
active courts make democracy work. The institutional deficiencies of
the other branches can produce undemocratic tendencies, such as
bureaucratic power grabbing. By offsetting these tendencies, policymaking courts preserve our democracy. Courts, therefore, should
make public policy and do so openly. Neely's conclusions are not
new, but his often cynical, street-wise perspective leads him to some
interesting arguments for judicial activism.
Neely's analysis begins with legislatures. These bodies, he notes,
are slow and cumbersome. Bicameral structures, numerous committees, and powerful committee chairmen often combine to delay and
defeat proposed legislation even before the bills reach the floor for a
vote. Because well-funded special interest groups can block or force
passage of specific measures, legislatures can reach undemocratic results. Popular measures might never pass, while unpopular policies
win legislative approval (pp. 47-68). These indictments of popular
assemblies, of course, are not novel.3 But Neely's explanation of the
reasons underlying the defects in the legislative process is intriguing.
That process, he argues, is consciously designed to offset the power
of special interest groups. Legislators want to kill as many bills as
possible without voting. More votes of record, even for popular
causes, would subject each legislator to almost certain defeat because
of the sheer number of special interests offended (pp. 54-58).4 Legislatures will remain cumbersome, Neely asserts, because legislators
want them to be cumbersome (p. 56).
Perhaps because his experience lies primarily in the legislature
and the judiciary, Neely's analysis of the executive branch is less insightful. Any bureaucracy, he argues, seeks power and influence (p.
102),5 and will engage in overreaching conduct to attain those ends.
Elected officials, moreover, cannot restrain or control the enormous
bureaucracies nominally at their disposal (p. 80). The President and
Vice-President, for example, are the only elected officials supervising
the millions of federal executive employees. As a result, the execu3. Political scientists have discussed these defects for years. See, e.g., W. KEEFE & M.
OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 484-87 (1968); Heard, Reform: Limits and Opportunities, in STATE LEGISLATURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 154 (A. Heard ed. 1966). Legal
theorists, in analyzing judicial activism, have also noted these defects. See, e.g., J. CHOPER,
supra note 1, at 16-25, 38-45.
4. Others have noted these undemocratic features without explaining why they exist in
almost all American legislative bodies. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, supra note 1. Keefe and Ogul,
noting the inability of legislatures to pass popular measures, have suspected that procedural
complexity is used to shield legislators from voting on the record. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL,
supra note 3, at 484 n.14. Neely's insight lies in treating these features as systemic rather than
aberrational in nature.
5. Neely refers those who would desire a more detailed analysis to other writers. See J,K,
GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973); C. REICH, THE GREENING OF
AMERICA (1970).
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tive branch, in contrast to the legislature, tends to be overly active (p.
113).
His analysis of the executive and legislative branches leads Neely
to two conclusions. He argues· first that an activist judiciary performs a valuable balancing function: Activist courts can offset the
institutional defects of the other branches of government. Courts
can make policy where the legislative process has broken down, and
restrain public agencies where the elected officials have not. Judges
should thus try to reach the results that the democratic institutions
would reach if they worked :flawlessly (pp. 113-14).
Neely then refers back to his institutional analysis to suggest conditions under which courts should play this demo~racy-enhancing
role. He concludes that judicial power is not unlimite'd and ~ttempts
to present criteria that courts can apply openly. Drawing on his experience on the bench, he argues that courts should intervene where
(1) the general good, as opposed to a special interest, is at stake; (2) a
majority of the public agree on the desired objective, but institutional defects have frustrated this majority; (3) the beneficiaries of
the intervention are powerless because of the institutional defects; 6
and (4) the judicial intervention will not force judges to become administrators (pp. 77-78, 168, 188-89). It is doubtful that beleaguered
trial courts will find these vague guidelines helpful.
The lack of institutional checks on the courts makes the openendedness of Neely's guidelines even more troubling. Only if effective institutional restraints limit judicial power can courts perform a
democratic balancing function. Without such restraints, judges
could ignore their theoretical balancing function and impose their
own political goals.7 But Neely fails to persuade the reader that effective constraints exist. He argues that because courts are sensitive
to legislative control of the judicial budget, they will limit their activism to avoid antagonizing the legislature (pp. 145-49).8 He also asserts that a strict code of ethics (pp. 193-96) and a natural desire to
do as little as possible (pp. 201-02) both discourage judicial interven6. This requirement differs from the second requirement. A majority of the population, for
example, might support increased state aid for poor school districts. Neely would not support
intervention here, even in the face of frustrating institutional defects, because the beneficiaries
of the intervention are very powerful. Teachers' groups and the education lobby incessantly
ask for more aid for eduction. These groups are not the hapless victims of institutional breakdowns. Pp. 170-89.
7. Lower courts are subject to appellate review. Restraints are needed, then, on appellate
courts. Professor Choper reduces this problem further by restricting his analysis to the restraints on the Supreme Court. See J. CHOPER, supra note 1, at 47-59.
8. Neely admits this budgetary power is less significant at the federal level. Individual
congressmen cannot accumulate the institutional power to retaliate against judges for decisions. Individual state legislators can gather this power. P. 60 n.2. Furthermore, under United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 20Q (1980), Congress cannot reduce the salary of federal judges. P.
201.
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tion beyond a balancing role. Neely never explains, however, why
these checks have not stemmed the tide of judicial activism in recent
years,9 and thus offers no means to ensure that courts will adhere to
his proposed guidelines. 10
Because Neely cannot identify effective institutional restraints on
the judiciary, his argument that courts make democracy work fails.
His insights are interesting and should further the debate on the
proper role of courts and judges, but How Courts Govern America
does not supply any answers. The book may, as Neely hopes, ultimately be more useful as a "primary source" for other scholars (p.
xii) than as an attempt to justify judicial activism.

' 9. In the chapter on judicial restraints, Neely only mentions that courts are asked to solve
problems today that would not have been brought to courts twenty years ago. P. 202. This
indirect reference is used to illustrate the increase in the judicial workload; Neely does not
consider how this increase in workload undercuts his proposed restraints.
10. In his analysis of the judicial balancing function, Neely implicitly assumes that courts
can decide when to intervene. Horowitz, in an empirical study, concluded that courts are particularly unfit to make this threshold intervention decision. Horowitz found courts poorly
suited to judge the consequences of policy-making, hence poorly suited to decide when to
intervene. D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 257-97 (1977).
Neely also overlooks the views of others in his analysis of restraints on the judiciary. Professor Choper notes that the basic restraints on the Supreme Court are impeachment and constitutional amendment. Neither of these restraints looms large as a practical matter. Because
of this lack of external restraints, the Supreme Court at times has held to positions that are
highly unpopular. J. CHOPER, supra note I, at 47-55.
Others have disagreed with Choper and Horowitz. See Chayes, supra note I, at 1307-09;
McGowan, Book Review, 79 MICH. L. REV. 616 (1981). Neely, however, does not attempt to
refute their arguments.

